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Combined small subgroups and side-channel attack
on elliptic curves with cofactor divisible by 2m
Michał Wron´ski
Abstract—Nowadays, alternative models of elliptic curves like
Montgomery, Edwards, twisted Edwards, Hessian, twisted Hes-
sian, Huff’s curves and many others are very popular and
many people use them in cryptosystems which are based on
elliptic curve cryptography. Most of these models allow to use
fast and complete arithmetic which is especially convenient in
fast implementations that are side-channel attacks resistant.
Montgomery, Edwards and twisted Edwards curves have always
order of group of rational points divisible by 4. Huff’s curves
have always order of rational points divisible by 8. Moreover,
sometimes to get fast and efficient implementations one can
choose elliptic curve with even bigger cofactor, for example 16.
Of course the bigger cofactor is, the smaller is the security of
cryptosystem which uses such elliptic curve. In this article will
be checked what influence on the security has form of cofactor of
elliptic curve and will be showed that in some situations elliptic
curves with cofactor divisible by 2m are vulnerable for combined
small subgroups and side-channel attacks.
Keywords—Small subgroups attack, side-channel attack, alter-
native models of elliptic curves
I. INTRODUCTION
IT is well known that during implementations of protocolsusing elliptic curve cryptography it should be checked if:
• the point which multiplicity k one wants to compute lies
on elliptic curve,
• computed point is not the point at infinity or it should be
ensured that scalar k will be smaller than prime order r
of the given point,
• side-channel resistant method of point scalar multiplica-
tion like ladder or complete arithmetic is implemented.
Because very frequently base field used for ECC is prime
field Fp, where p and r = #E(Fp) are large coprime
primes, it is easy to forget about checking if given point which
lies on elliptic curve is the one of the correct order. Alternative
models of elliptic curves like Montgomery, Edwards, twisted
Edwards or Huff’s curves have always order of form hr,
where r in cryptographic applications is large prime and h is
cofactor divisible by 4, so checking if given point has correct
order should be always performed. If one wants to fast find
if order of given point P 6= O is equal to prime r, then
the easiest way is to compute [r]P and check if it is equal
to O. If yes, then P has order r. Otherwise, P has order
different from r. Sometimes checking of the order of a given
point is not performed because it requires computing of point
scalar multiplication by r, so it is very inefficient and small
subgroup attacks which may be in this case performed seems
not to be too dangerous. If elliptic curve is cyclic, then one
can find point P ′ of order hr and then perform attack faster
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than generic Pollard’s Rho for point P of order r for about
α
√
h times, where α denotes the ratio of expected time of
computing discrete logarithm on elliptic curve using Pollard’s
rho to Gaudry-Schost algorithm over the same field and the
same size of interval. It is worth to note that for small h
the gain is very small. Unfortunately, if order of the point is
not checked and cofactor is divisible by 2m, then adversary
who performed side-channel attack has knowledge about m the
least significant bits of private key k. Combined attack using
points of low order and side-channel attack is described in [1],
where it is assumed that adversary has unlimited access to the
device and he is able to make fault injections. Genkin et al.
in [2] described the flush+reload attack on Curve25519 using
side-channel leakage during interactions of the point at infinity,
order-2, and order-4 elements in the Montgomery ladder. In
this article will be only assumed that order of the given point
is not checked and then the scalar multiplication of the point
lying on the curve but having not prime order r may be done.
II. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF ELLIPTIC CURVES
In this section are described basic information about alterna-
tive models of elliptic curves having order of rational points
always divisible at least by 4. For these alternative models
of elliptic curve combined small subgroups and side-channel
attack may be performed if order of given point is not checked.
A. Montgomery curves
Montgomery curves were developed by Montgomery and
described in [3]. Montgomery curve over field K is given by
the equation EM,a,b/K : by2 = x3 + ax2 + x, where a, b ∈ K
and b(a2 − 4) 6= 0. The neutral element of group addition
law is point at infinity O and opposite point to the point
P = (x, y) is point −P = (x,−y). For every Montgomery
curve exists some isomorphic elliptic curve in Weierstrass
form. The order of rational points of Montgomery curve is
always divisible by 4. Moreover, every Montgomery curve is
birationally equivalent with some twisted Edwards curve. On
Montgomery curve it is possible to use Montgomery ladder
using XZ coordinates.
B. Edwards and twisted Edwards curves
Edwards and tiwsted Edwards curves are well described in
[4], [5] and [6].
Twisted Edwards curve over field K with characteristic
different from 2 is given by the equation ETE,a,d/K : ax2 +
y2 = 1+dx2y2, where a, d ∈ K and a(d− 1) 6= 0. Moreover,
a is square in K and d is not square or a is not square in K
and then d is a square. For every twisted Edwards curve exists
some isomorphic elliptic curve in short Weierstrass form. If
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a = 1, then curve is an Edwards curve. The point (0, 1) is
neutral element of group addition law and for point P = (x, y)
and negation of point P is −P = (−x1, y1). Because it is
possible to use the same formula for points addition and point
doubling and no special cases like addition of opposite point
or point at infinity need to be considered, on twisted Edwards
curve it is possible to use complete arithmetic.
C. Huff’s curves
Huff’s curves were firstly described in [7]. Let K denote a
field of characteristic different from 2. Huff’s curve is given
by equation
EHu,a,b/K : ay(x2 − 1) = by(x2 − 1),
where a, b ∈ K∗ and a2 6= b2. The neutral point of group
addition law is O = (0, 0) and opposite point for P = (x, y)
is point −P = (−x,−y). Every elliptic curve over field of
odd characteristic which contains a copy of Z/4Z × Z/2Z
is birationally equivalent with some Huff’s curve. On Huff’s
curves it is possible to use complete arithmetic for point scalar
multiplication.
III. METHODS OF POINT SCALAR MULTIPLICATION ON
ELLIPTIC CURVES
A. Binary (double-and-add) method
Double-and-add method is one of the simplest method
of point scalar multiplication on elliptic curves. Its origin
comes from fast modular powering method. In double-and-
add method the private key k needs to be written in binary
form. Computations start from the most significant bit and
ends after computations for the least significant bit. If the given
bit is equal to 0, then it is necessary to make doubling of the
actual point and if bit is equal to 1, then additionally it is
required to make addition of the generator to the given point.
This method is presented in the algorithm 1 and its resistance
against side-channel attacks is described in subsection VII-A.
Algorithm 1 Binary (double-and-add) method
Input: P ∈ E,k ∈ Z, k = (kd−1, ..., k0)2
Output: Q = [k]P
Q = O;
for j = l − 1 to 0 by −1 do
Q = doubling(Q);
if kj = 1 then
Q = addition(Q,P );
end
end
return Q;
If points addition and doubling is computed using the same
formulas and no special cases need to be considered, then
it is possible to use double-and-add method with complete
arithmetic. In this case doubling is computed as addition of
two the same points. The algorithm of point scalar multiplica-
tion using double-and-add method and complete arithmetic is
presented in the algorithm 2. Resistance of this method against
side-channel attacks is described in subsection VII-B.
Algorithm 2 Binary (double-and-add) method using complete
arithmetic
Input: P ∈ E,k ∈ Z, k = (kd−1, ..., k0)2
Output: Q = [k]P
Q = O;
for j = l − 1 to 0 by −1 do
Q = addition(Q,Q);
if kj = 1 then
Q = addition(Q,P );
end
end
return Q;
B. Ladders
One of the most popular method of point scalar multi-
plication which is simple side-channel attacks resistant is
an analogue of powering ladder. The best example of such
ladder is Montgomery ladder given by Montgomery in [3],
which allows one to perform point scalar multiplication on
Montgomery curve using XZ coordinates in constant time (if
implementation is proper) for each bit. The single step of this
method is presented in algorithm 3.
It is also possible to use Montgomery ladder for every model
of elliptic curve using algorithm 4.
In ladder algorithms, for every bit of private key k
from the pair of points ([m]P, [m + 1]P ) one gets al-
ways ([2m]P, [2m+ 1]P ) if given bit is equal to 0 or
([2m+ 1], [2m+ 2]P ), if given bit is equal to 1. The resis-
tance of this method against side-channel attacks is described
in section VII-C.
Algorithm 3 The single step of the Montgomery ladder using
XZ coordinates.
Input: P1, P2 ∈ EM,a,b(K), where P1 = (X1, Z1), P2 =
(X2, Z2), 4a24 = a + 2 and P3 = (X3, Z3),
P1, P2, P3 ∈ EM,a,b/K : by2 = x3 + ax2 + x
Output: P4 = (X4, Z4), P5 = (X5, Z5), P4, P5 ∈ EM :
by2 = x3 + ax2 + x
1. A = X2 + Z2;
2. AA = A2;
3. B = X2 − Z2;
4. BB = B2;
5. E = AA−BB;
6. C = X3 + Z3;
7. D = X3 − Z3;
8. DA = D ·A;
9. CB = C ·B;
10. X5 = Z1 · (DA+ CB)2;
11. Z5 = X1 · (DA− CB)2;
12. X4 = AA ·BB;
13. Z4 = E · (BB + a24 · E);
return P4 = (X4, Z4), P5 = (X5, Z5);
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Algorithm 4 Montgomery ladder.
Input: Point P and positive integer k = (km, km−1, ..., k0)
Output: Point Q = [k]P
R0 = O;
R1 = P ;
for i from m downto 0 do
if di = 0 then
R1 = addition(R0, R1);
R0 = doubling(R0);
end
else
R0 = addition(R0, R1);
R1 = doubling(R1);
end
end
return R0;
IV. POHLIG-HELLMAN AND FAULT ATTACKS ON ECC
A. Pohlig-Hellman attack
Pohlig-Hellman attack was developed by Pohlig and
Hellman in 1976 and described in [8]. It uses fact that if
elliptic curve has order of group of rational points divisible
by many prime factors, then it is easy to find the private
key k. Let’s assume that point P from curve E has order
which is product of coprime factors p1, . . . , pn. Numbers
p1, . . . , pn need not to be prime but may be the power of
prime number. Let Q = [k]P , where k is the private key
and Q is the public key and pi =
∏n
i=1 pi. One can now
compute Q1 =
[∏n
j=2 pj
]
Q = [k]
([∏n
j=2 pj
]
P
)
, Q2 =[∏n
j=1,j 6=2 pj
]
Q = [k]
([∏n
j=1,j 6=2 pj
]
P
)
, . . . , Qn =[∏n
j=1,j 6=n pj
]
Q = [k]
([∏n
j=1,j 6=i pj
]
P
)
. It is obvious that
points
[∏n
j=2 pj
]
P,
[∏n
j=1,j 6=2 pj
]
P, . . . ,
[∏n
j=1,j 6=n pj
]
P
has orders p1, . . . , pn respectively. Because numbers
p1, . . . , pn are small, then using Chinese remainder theorem
for system of linear congruences
k ≡ l1(mod p1),
k ≡ l2(mod p2),
. . .
k ≡ ln(mod pn),
it is easy to find k and the attack is finished.
B. Fault attacks
The description of fault attacks may be found for example in
[9]–[11]. These attacks may be performed for implementations
if one does not check if point which multiplicity should be
computed lies on elliptic curve. There are many kinds of these
attacks but two the most popular are:
1) attack on twisted curve,
2) attack on arithmetic which does not use the all parame-
ters of elliptic curve.
The first of these attacks uses fact that the twist of elliptic
curve may have order having small (comparing to the size
of the base field) cofactors. In this case the adversary, for
example, may find the point P t which does not lie on elliptic
curve over prime field E/Fq : y2 = x3 + ax + b but it lies
on its quadratic twist Et/Fq : cy2 = x3 + ax + b, where c
is not square in the field Fq . In the next step the point P t is
sent to Alice. Even if implementations of points addition and
point doubling use all parameters of elliptic curve, then the
operations will be also proper for twisted curve. If #Et has
small factors, then adversary may find Alice’s private key k
using Pohlig-Hellman attack.
The second attack is similar but uses fact that imple-
mentations of elliptic curve operations does not require all
parameters of elliptic curve. In this case adversary may use
every elliptic curve which has the same parameters, used
for elliptic curve operations, as curve E. It is possible to
manipulate parameters which arithmetic on elliptic curve does
not use. For example, for short Weierstrass curve over prime
field E/Fq : y2 = x3 + ax + b one can use points addition
and point doubling formulas which does not use parameter
b. So adversary can find some elliptic curve of the form
E′/Fq : y2 = x3 + ax+ b′, which order of group of rational
points has small divisors. As same as in the first attack, also
in this case the Pohlig-Hellman attack may be used to find k.
Presented ideas may be used also for binary curves.
V. SMALL SUBGROUPS ATTACK
Small subgroups attack was firstly described in the case
of discrete logarithm computation over prime fields in [12].
Zuccherato in [13] showed how small subgroups attacks can
be performed in the case of elliptic curves. Sometimes if
implementation is not made properly, then the order r of the
point is not checked. In this case, if elliptic curve has the point
of order #E(Fq) which has small divisors, one can make the
attack described below:
1) one should find a point of order #E(Fq) (if group of
rational points of elliptic curve is not cyclic, then it is
possible to find several points of different orders and the
first steps of the attack must be then made several times,
once for each point),
2) for all small coprime divisors p1, p2, . . . , pn of curve
order #E, it is necessary to compute the products pii =∏n
j=1,j 6=i pj ,
3) in the next step one sends to Alice point P of order #E,
and then receives from Alice point Q = [k]P ,
4) now it is necessary to compute Q1 = [pi1]Q =
[k] ([pi1]P ) , Q2 = [pi2]Q = [k] ([pi2]P ) , . . . , Qn =
[pin]Q = [k] ([pin]P ), respectively,
5) now let’s see that every of points Q1, . . . , Qk has order
being divisor of pii and because of that it is easy to find
for each i = 1, n the result of operation li = k mod pi,
6) now one has to solve the system of linear congruences
L ≡ l1(mod p1),
L ≡ l2(mod p2),
. . .
L ≡ ln(mod pn),
which by Chinese remainder theorem has exactly one
solution in the set {0, . . . ,∏nj=1 pj − 1},
7) now it is necessary to compute L = k mod
∏n
j=1 pj and
it is easy to see that
[∏n
j=1 pj
]
Q = [k]
([∏n
j=1 pj
]
P
)
,
8) making substitutions P ′ =
([∏n
j=1 pj
]
P
)
, Q′ =[∏n
j=1 pj
]
Q one receives Q′ = [k]P ′,
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9) using k = m · ∏nj=1 pj + L, one gets Q′ =[
m ·∏nj=1 pj + L]P ′ = [m ·∏nj=1 pj]P ′ + [L]P ′,
which is equivalent to Q′ − [L]P ′ =
[
m ·∏nj=1 pj]P ′
and finally to[(∏n
j=1 pj
)−1]
(Q′ − [L]P ′) = [m]P ′,
10) because k = m ·∏nj=1 pj + L < r, then m < r−L∏n
j=1 pj
and finally the sought value is in much smaller interval
so one can use Pollard’s lambda or Gaudry-Schost
algorithm to find m.
Now it is easy to see that expected time for find m will
be about α
√∏n
j=1 pi shorter than expected time of finding k
if no other informations are given. If cofactor is equal to 2m
then small subgroups attack will be faster for about α ·2m2 . Of
course adversary also knows the k mod
∏n
j=1 pi, which gives
some knowledge about k and may help to perform successful
attack, what will be showed later.
VI. WORKING EXAMPLE
Given is an elliptic curve in twisted Edwards form
ETE,a,d/Fp : ax2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2 over prime field, where
p = 2255 − 19, a = 25, d = 2. The order #ETE,a,d(Fp) of
this curve is equal to 23 · r, where r is large prime equal to
r = 7237005577332262213973186563042994240\
810436479626757246112137716528066531403.
This elliptic curve may be found in [6].
Now let’s see that the order of this curve is divisible by 8.
We will use this fact to perform combined attack using small
subgroups and side-channel attack.
Because group of rational points of curve ETE,a,d/Fp is
cyclic, firstly is found the point of order #ETE,a,d(Fp). In
the next step this point is sent to Alice. Alice will use her
private key k for computing Q = [k]P , where in this example
P = (2561695780460675429183073143611335391\
2445229295974976997496753296672030409897,
415879197266491886855167603920446349017\
47251551319301365710869190965495637268)
and
k = 3246952806144862811508043550870821340\
8051927704950993777692826804070954214002.
Then the adversary will compute Q1 = [r]Q and P1 = [r]P .
Because order of the point Q1 is one of the divisors of 8, it is
very easy to find out that Q1 = [2]P1. So now it is known that
k ≡ 2(mod 8). Moreover, also three the least significant bits
of the private key k are known and this knowledge may be
used by adversary to perform side-channel attack with bigger
probability of success. It is worth to note that in [14] are
presented methods of protection against this kind of attacks.
The simplest way of protection against these attacks is to
always use private keys k divisible by 8. But even then simple
side-channel attacks need not to be much harder. One may
find out that the last operations which are performed for
bits equal to 0 has similar time of computing. If there are
operations which requires much more/less time then there is
a big probability that these operations are performed for bits
of private key k equal to 1. Below will be presented some
implementations of twisted Edwards curve ETE,25,2/F2255−19
arithmetic in inverted coordinates using different methods.
VII. SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS USING SMALL SUBGROUPS
ATTACK
One should note that if cofactor of elliptic curve is divisible
by 2m, then small subgroups attacks gives knowledge about
m least significant bits of private key k. This knowledge may
be very dangerous, because adversary may:
1) get know what type of point scalar multiplication was
used in implementation,
2) having this knowledge and characteristics from side-
channel attack he can use some methods to find differ-
ences in characteristics when bit of private key is equal
to 0 and when the bit of private key is equal to 1 and
therefore in some cases he will be able to find the whole
private key.
Of course the more bits of private key are known the easier is
to perform side-channel attack and then find the whole private
key. It is worth to note that even knowledge about a few bits
may be very useful.
A. Double-and-add method
Classical double-and-add method for point scalar multipli-
cation is one of the most vulnerable for side-channel attacks.
Even without knowledge of any bit it should be easy to find
the all bits of private key after performing this attack. On the
figure 1 are presented numbers of clock cycles required for any
operation of points addition or doubling and therefore because
addition is longer than doubling it is easy to find the private
key k. This and other implementations were implemented in
Magma and use built field arithmetic.
Fig. 1. Timing attack for twisted Edwards curve ETE,25,2/F2255−19 with
binary method for point scalar multiplication.
COMBINED SMALL SUBGROUPS AND SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACK ON ELLIPTIC CURVES WITH COFACTOR DIVISIBLE BY 2M 207
B. Complete arithmetic
Complete arithmetic is much more side-channel attacks
resistant than classic binary (double-and-add) method. Un-
fortunately, if bad implemented, this method may be also
vulnerable for side-channel attacks. For example, using built
field arithmetic, no matter if complete arithmetic is used, some
operations during point doubling will be squares and in point
addition they must be computed as normal multiplication.
Moreover, for simplicity and efficiency reasons, the generator
which is used in points addition may have Z coordinate
equal to 1 and because of that multiplication by 1 will be
much faster in generic situations than multiplication by some
random number. So it is easy to see that points addition and
doubling may not take exactly the same time and in such
case if adversary has knowledge about even few bits, he can
use this knowledge to find some more bits of private key k.
This can be done by comparing the value of known bits with
given characteristics from side-channel attacks. To prevent
simple side-channel attacks, complete arithmetic should be
implemented to be constant time. On the figure 2 is presented
timing attack on badly implemented point scalar multiplication
using complete arithmetic. The biggest mistake is to set in
the generator P its Z-coordinate to 1 and therefore during
point addition in the first step is computed Z2 ·1, where Z2 is
Z-coordinate of the second point. In point doubling in this
step will be computed Z2 · Z2, so if multiplication is not
implemented as constant time, then points addition should be
faster than point doubling.
Fig. 2. Timing attack for twisted Edwards curve ETE,25,2/F2255−19 with
complete arithmetic binary method of point scalar multiplication and Z-
coordinate of generator equal to 1.
It is easy to see that knowledge about three the least
significant bits is helpful, because adversary can see that point
addition is faster than point doubling and therefore there is a
big probability that it is not an accident. So for the others
bits of private key there will be a big probability that points
addition will be faster than doubling. This knowledge may
be crucial in the process of searching for private key k. For
example, operations from 380 to 383 presented in the figure
2 took:
• operation number 380 (doubling, bit of private key k is
equal to 0): 27980 clock cycles,
• operation number 381 (doubling, bit of private key k is
equal to 1, the first operation for this bit): 27832 clock
cycles,
• operation number 382 (addition, bit of private key k is
equal to 1, the second operation for this bit): 27564 clock
cycles,
• operation number 383 (doubling, bit of private key k is
equal to 0): 28028 clock cycles.
This situation is presented in figure 3.
Fig. 3. Timing attack for twisted Edwards curve ETE,25,2/F2255−19 with
binary method of point scalar multiplication and Z-coordinate of generator
equal to 1 - three the least significant bits.
Because adversary knows that point scalar multiplication
by private key k requires 383 operations and that three the
least significant bits are equal to 0, 1, 0, he may deduce that
implementation uses complete arithmetic which has some
implementational mistakes. Let’s see that points addition took
smaller amount of time (operation 382) than point doubling
(operations 380, 381 and 383). It is also easy to see in
this case that arithmetic does not use simple binary method,
because results presented in the figure 3 are not similar to
the results presented in the figure 1, where binary method
with different formulas for addition and doubling was used.
Therefore, adversary may guess that the average time of points
addition is smaller than the average time of point doubling and
he may easier find the private key k. If adversary knows three
the least significant bits, then the best situation for him would
be if not all of these bits are zeros, because in this case he
may find some differences between their characteristics and
it should be easier for him to perform side-channel attack.
The probability that in this case not all bits are equal to zero
is equal to 78 . It is worth to note that even if all the least
significant bits are equal to zero, it is possible to get some
information about used arithmetic and adversary may guess
which operations are points additions and which are point
doublings.
In the figure 4 is presented situation when Z-coordinate of
the generator is set to some large random value. In this case
it is much harder to guess which bit is equal to 0 and which
is equal to 1. Even knowledge about three the least significant
bits is not as helpful as previous.
C. Ladders
Using ladders like Montgomery ladder or others seems to
be invulnerable for side-channel attacks even if there are some
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Fig. 4. Timing attack for twisted Edwards curve ETE,25,2/F2255−19 with
Z-coordinate of generator being large random number.
implementational mistakes. One of such mistakes is using
for example if-else if for checking if the given bit is equal
to 0 or to 1 instead of using case or even if-else clauses.
Such mistakes may result in that for one of the values (for
example for value 1) of bits of the private key there will
be always performed some additional cycles during checking
of the first condition. Instead of that, even then it is hard to
get some knowledge about any others bits of private key and
knowledge of a few the least significant bits seems not to
be too much helpful. Figures 5 and 6 present timing attack
for ladder implementation of point scalar multiplication for
Edwards curve in inverted coordinates.
Fig. 5. Timing attack for twisted Edwards curve ETE,25,2/F2255−19 with
ladder method for point scalar multiplication - number of clock cycles for all
operations for given bit.
Fig. 6. Timing attack for twisted Edwards curve ETE,25,2/F2255−19 with
ladder method for point scalar multiplication - number of clock cycles for eah
operation of points addition and point doubling.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Using alternative models of elliptic curves with cofactor
bigger than 1 requires checking during computations if order
of given point is correct (large prime) or using private keys
which are divisible by cofactor of elliptic curve. If the order
of point is not checked, then small subgroups attack may be
performed but in most cases this attack will not be dangerous
because the gain should be small. Unfortunately, if cofactor is
equal to or divisible by 2m, then combined attack using small
subgroups attack and side-channel attack may give knowledge
about m least significant bits of private key k and therefore
if there are some other mistakes in implementation of point
scalar multiplication, then characteristics taken from side-
channel attacks may be very dangerous and adversary may
be able even to guess the whole private key k.
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